``... get away from Cartesian intellectualism, with its understanding of being as a belief system implicit in the minds of individual subjects, and return to an understanding of being as`the social with which we are in contact by the mere fact of existing and which we carry with us inseparably before any objectifications ' '' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, page 362) . In other words, although sometimes we frame representations, sometimes we do not (our actions are unformulated if sensitive to our situation and goals), and so an understanding of the subject in practice is, Thrift contends, fundamental to the makingöthat is, performanceöof human geographies. Furthermore, Thrift argues that we need to be aware of practical intelligibility and inarticulate understanding precisely because they form the background through which the representations we make become comprehensible. In short, the outcome of Thrift's critique of representation is that the emphasis of human geography should be on practicesöeither on their reproduction (stable repetitions), or on the production of new practices (perhaps inspired improvisations)öbecause it is practices (performances using materials to hand) rather than representations that are at the root of the geographies that humans make every day. It is this emphasis on practicesöthrough processöthat has led Thrift to ideas about performance and to an interest in research on such practices as dancing.
However, although Thrift's ideas about nonrepresentational theory are certainly interesting (but should not Thrift's ideas really be called antirepresentational? how are Thrift's ideas`nonrepresentational' exactly?) they are not what this paper is about. This paper is not an attempt to contribute to, or align the thinking of Baudrillard with, what at the moment is being called`nonrepresentational theory'. In other words, I am not trying to bind Baudrillard into a future`nonrepresentational turn' that is centred upon practices and the background. What I am arguing in this paper is that there are other quite different ideas that you might, perhaps more obviously, call`nonrepresentational theory'. Indeed, I thought about giving this paper the title`nonrepresentational theories' because surely there are poststructuralist ideasöthose of Baudrillard, for exampleöthat could be called`nonrepresentational'. Thus, I will try to show in this paper how Baudrillard's ideas play themselves out if you are thinking about how theory might be somehow nonrepresentational. I will argue that Baudrillard's critique of representation (whether you agree with it, or not) has an end logic that pushes one towards the idea of developing a form of theorising that is nonrepresentational and that is a quite different form of nonrepresentational theory to anything that Thrift is writing about. In short, what I will try to make clear here is that what you might call nonrepresentational theory' is contentious and Thrift's nonrepresentational theory is certainly not the only form of theory that you might call`nonrepresentational'.
In the grand tradition of social theory, Thrift has been trying to convince us that a whole set of famous thinkers can be brought into the fold of his nonrepresentational theory. Thrift (1999, page 303) has produced a diagram of what he calls``the life-time-lines of non-representational theory'', where he lists, labels, and lumps together all sorts of people: Mead, Goffman, Blumer, Garfinkel, Husserl, Bergson, Bachelard, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Benjamin, Merleau-Ponty, de Certeau, Deleuze, Foucault, Irigaray, Bourdieu, Giddens, Bakhtin, Vgotsky, Shotter, Haraway, Butler, Game, Grosz, Latour, and Law. Now, my observation from this list is simply that in developing his style of nonrepresentational theory Thrift has deliberately missed out several distinguished poststructuralists (such as Baudrillard, Lyotard, and Derrida) (2) (2) Thrift (1996) has written about poststructuralism and its influence on his nonrepresentational theory. He labels Derrida's and Lyotard's projects as problematic in that they are`representational^referential', and contrasts these with Foucault's and Deleuze's (and Guattari's) projects, with which he largely agrees, and regards as`nonrepresentational^practical'. This explains Thrift's from his list of inspirations. These omissions are, I think, consistent with Thrift's aims, but nevertheless the point can be made that these philosophers are among the most sophisticated of those who have devoted and dedicated themselves above all to the critique of representation. Therefore it is quite logical that the ideas of these writers may prove instructive to the development of a whole range of theories (quite unlike those of Thrift) that somehow move on from the poststructuralist critique of representation. Therefore, in order to diversify furtherö to push us to think about nonrepresentational theories rather than just about nonrepresentational theory ö in this paper I will illustrate and develop some of Baudrillard's highly original contributions to the thorny issue of representation and nonrepresentation. First, a description of the shifting of contexts that drives the movement of Baudrillard's thinking from representational to nonrepresentational theory will be discussed. This movement is, in other words, the shift to the situation where signification has replaced reality to such an extent that the world is no more than a giant simulacrum or simulation where signs refer only to other signs within a closed system. This is a world of semiotic models where there is no real world or referent, because now signs of the real have replaced (3) the real itself, where signs no longer have contact with the world they allegedly represent precisely because there is no break between words and things or between representations and the real as the two sides have`fused' (perhaps a better word would be`disappeared') into one substance. Second, I will discuss how theory might respond to this semiotic saturation, and disturbing situation, where critique (based on representation and pretending to stand outside the system) is redundant, vanishing in the play of signs. Baudrillard's nonrepresentational theory is shown to be another way of undoing structures (such as those that structuralism and the like went to such lengths to`reveal') in that its aim is to burn signs in the pursuit of that nothing which runs beneath the apparent continuity of meaning (see Baudrillard, 1996a) .
(2) continued omission of Lyotard and Derrida from the diagram. Thrift has also pointed to the differences between Derrida, on the one hand, and Deleuze and Foucault, on the other, in a brief critique of representational critical geopolitics (2000b). However, it should be said that the distinction that Thrift draws between, say, Derrida and Deleuze (perhaps the most emblematic advocates of philosophies of difference) has been made elsewhere [and, I think, has been somewhat overstated by a general failure to appreciate Derrida's (1994) and Deleuze and Guattari's (1983a) critiques of use value, whichöwhile having differencesöare in many ways written in the same frame of mind as Baudrillard's critique (1975; 1981) ]. For example, Holland (1999, page 152) has, like Thrift, come to consider Deleuze's theoretical position as an ontology of practice, rather than as an ontology of becoming,``... provided that we understand`practice' (as its other meanings suggest) as a matter of productive repetition''. (3) A colleague pointed out that my use of words such as`replaced' and`substituting' might give the impression that there was once a really-real world untouched by signs and simulacra. However, Baudrillard's position is that the really real has always been out of play and beyond reach, just like an infinitely receding horizon projected from the vanishing point of the present. Interestingly, it is the failure to appreciate this point that seems to be the reason for Baudrillard being repeatedly charged with technological determinism (for example, see Bingham, 1996; Thrift, 2000c) . Many writers make the mistake of equating Baudrillard's ideas on simulation and simulacra with computers, information technology, and the like, rather than appreciating the time span and exact nature of Baudrillard's critique of representation. In short, if you read Baudrillard's oeuvre you will find that it is based on the commodity-cum-sign and the symbolic (see Smith, 1997 ; Smith with Doel, 2001), and not on the age-old tradition of glorifying the latest technology, whether it be the printing press, electricity, railways, the electric telegraph, television, or the World Wide Web.
The precession and orders of simulacra: representational to nonrepresentational theorỳ`S omething sizzled to the right of him. A commercial ... had attached itself to his car.`Get off ', he warned it. But the commercial, well adhered, began to crawl, buffeted by the wind, toward the door and the entrance crack. '' Philip K Dick The Simulacra (1964, page 45) Baudrillard is a lapsed sociologist and a post-Marxist philosopher (4) who, amongst other things, became famous and infamous for his work on simulations and simulacra (1981; 1983; 1988; 1994a; 1994b; 1995; 1996a; 1999; 2000; 2001a) . However, Baudrillard's usage of these terms is quite different to the more common usages of the words. Consider the common usage of the term`simulacra' as deployed by Philip K Dick in his novel The Simulacra (1964) . Set in the 21st century, Dick's narrative revolves around the idea of a false image and a true real. In the story the president is a simulacra, the first lady is an actress, and both are frequently on television. However, whereas the majority of the world's population believe the couple are`the real deal' (the elected holders of power) it becomes clear as the story unfolds that the actual rulers of the world (with whom power resides) are a small secret (unelected) ruling council consisting of nine people (who never appear on television). Thus, in Dick's fiction, simulacra are images and have an ideological function serving to conceal and hide the true power`behind the throne'. But Baudrillard's ideas about simulacra and simulations are quite different to those of Dick. For Baudrillard, the distinction between true and false, or image and reality, has vanished into one substance. The difference between the two writers is the crux of journeying without maps. It is Baudrillard's model of the precession of simulacraöof the rise and rise of the sign insofar as it is the evolution of imagery and the destiny of representationöwhich will serve as the outline for this paper as we journey from representational to nonrepresentational theory. The precession of the image (or map, or theory) has four stages (one and two being representational, and three and four being nonrepresentational) and moves as follows: from the first (where the image reflects a basic reality and stands for some truth) and second stages (where the image masks and perverts a basic reality and truth), in which signs dissimulate something (that is, feign not to have something), to the third (where the image masks the absence of a basic reality and truth) and fourth stages (where the image bears no relation to any reality and truth whatsoever), in which signs dissimulate that there is nothing. The entrance into simulation begins with the third stage because,``simulation is the situation created by any system of signs when it becomes sophisticated enough, autonomous enough, to abolish its own referent and to replace it with itself '' (Baudrillard, 1991a, page 157; my translation) . Here the imageöfor all purposesöis reality. This chain of signifiers, as we shall see, is also the turning point for the production of theory, which similarly also has to be nonrepresentational (Baudrillard, 1975) ] in relation to both Marxism and poststructuralism. Those who describe Baudrillard as a postmodernist (for example, Latour, 1993) are incorrect (see Gane, 1990) , perhaps having conservative motives and methodologies, unable to go as far left as poststructuralism. Marxists describe the latest phase of capitalism as`postmodern', thus describing capitalism as`postmodernism' or`postmodernity'. They also, at times, call poststructuralism by the name of`postmodernism', and refer to Baudrillard's work as`postmodernist' in particular (for example, see Harvey, 1989a, page 351) . Abracadabra! Poststructuralism must, therefore, also be complicit with the latest stage of capitalism because it shares its`postmodern' name (see Rivkin and Ryan, 1998 , pages 356^357). For example, Harvey (1989b, page 351) writes that the frenetic writings of Baudrillard and Virilio,``... seem hell-bent on fusing with time^space compression and replicating it in their own flamboyant rhetoric'', before casually asserting that,``... postmodernism always has trouble in taking itself seriously''.
(or self-referential) if it is to challenge and change the contours of our inseparable materialised and dematerialised geographies.
In parallel to the precession of simulacra Baudrillard has outlined what he calls the orders of simulacra. The orders are Baudrillard's strangely Foucauldian-like attempt, (5) albeit brief, to give the precession a historical genealogy [analogous to Marx's attempt in The Poverty of Philosophy (1963) to produce a kind of genealogy of the system of exchange value (see Baudrillard, 1975) ]. Baudrillard outlines a brief history of the passage to hyperreality, where reality has been converted into empty signs. Since the Renaissance the precession of simulacra has been in collusion with mutations of the law of value: (1) the natural law of valueöin the`classical' period (from the Renaissance to the industrial revolution) counterfeit was the dominant scheme; (2) the commercial law of value öin the industrial era production was the dominant scheme; (3) the structural law of valueöin this scheme simulation is dominant, which is governed by the code; (4) the fractal stage of valueöour current scheme is that of the pure simulacrum, where there is no point of reference and no law of value.
Baudrillard has provided examples and discussion of each of these periods, but for our purposes it is the jump from the commercial law of value to the structural law of value which will be pertinent in the discussion, because in the structural law of value we are no longer in,``... the disenchanted universe of the signified, common denominator of the real world ...'' (Baudrillard, 1983, page 85) . In the final two stages the ambition of a universal semiotic (also known as the code, the code of social standing, the structural law of value, the hyperreal, simulations, or simulacra) with a certain economic and cultural hegemony has been realised (there is no more obliged sign of the natural law, or emancipated and arbitrary sign of the commercial law), and is closed like,``... a stucco angel whose extremities were joined along one curve'' (Baroque Apocalypse 16th century, cited in Baudrillard, 1978, unpaginated) . (6) In this paper the various stages or phases of the precession and orders of simulacra will be discussed through various discussions of maps (or theories) and territories (or the real) to outline with some clarity the steps and rationale for Baudrillard's suggestion of a new form of theorising. (7) Phase one of this new form of theorising will be examined and illustrated through a discussion of Harvey's (1972; 1989b) scientific and referential (5) I write`strangely' because Baudrillard later noted that,``... the order of simulation is antinomical to genealogy' ' (1987, page 73) . Indeed, with simulation you get the reabsorption of all genealogy. It may then seem`strange' to some readers that I have followed Baudrillard's genealogy to structure this paper. However, I came to the conclusion that illustrating the stages of the genealogy with materials familiar and accessible to geographers was the clearest way to guide the reader to how Baudrillard's theory is doubly nonrepresentational. (6) Baudrillard's poetry from the 1950s was published in French in 1978 and has recently been translated into English in The Uncollected Baudrillard (Baudrillard, 2001b, pages 78^90) . (7) In this paper, images, maps, and theories, and territories and`reality', are treated as synonymous before the distinction between the two sides is abolished in the simulacrum. This is in line with Baudrillard's usage, but undoubtedly becomes problematic if one believes (in a delusional moment) in the idea of a general`poststructuralism' (this term was not widely used in France) that obliterates the differences between quite different authors. This is because other key writers have used these terms rather differently. For example, Deleuze and Guattari (1983b) have written about how their concept of the rhizome is like a map. For them the map is about establishing contact with the real experimentally and, like their concept of the rhizome, has multiple entrances and is open,``... connectable in all its dimensions, and capable of being dismantled; it is reversible, and susceptible to constant modification'' (page 26). In short, Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome is an obvious starting point for those looking for an explicitly nonrepresentational take on maps.
explanations of how theories (normative, probablistic, scientific, neo-Marxist) are like maps (conventional and cognitive). Phase two will be illustrated through stories by Garrison Keillor, Suarez Miranda, and Lewis Carroll to reveal how the`critical' theories that we are all so familiar with are representational theories in which the representation comes to have priority and power. This is the phase of theories of ideology or false consciousness, where humans are seen as reified and alienated. Phases three and four are where any representational theory (those theories from phases one and two) would fail to appreciate the implosion of binaries, such as true and false or real and imaginary, that produce simulations, simulacra, and reproductions. Phase three is illustrated by Baudrillard with the story of the iconoclasts who feared images of the deityöfeared the murderous capacity of the signifieröbecause they saw these images as testimony to the absence of a deity. For our purposes this phase will be discussed through an explanation of Baudrillard's theorisation oföthrough a merging and critique of the Saussurian sign and Marx's commodityöthe political economy of the sign and hyperreality where the signified and use value (like the deity) are found ultimately to be absent. Phase four is the phase where no system of signification can (re)present the world in its full presence: it is the phase of pure simulation. In this phase I point to how theory for Baudrillard has to become nonrepresentational if it is to encounter and challenge the simulacrum. By the end of the paper it should be clear that what Baudrillard argues is that we must journey without maps and burn the signs as we go along.
Phase one: territories before maps`.
.. the imageöit is the reflection of a basic reality.'' Baudrillard (1983, page 11)`W hen one looks at a certain object only as representing another, the idea one has of it is a sign. This is usually how one looks at maps and paintings ... . Hence one can say, spontaneously and nonchalantly, ... that a map of Italy is Italy.'' Antoine Arnauld Logique de Port-Royal 1872 (cited in Jean, 1998, page 63) What is the role of theory? This was the question that vexed Harvey back in the early 1970s and which led him to write a book chapteröinspired by philosophers of science like Toulmin (1960) öwhich explains to geographers how one can view theories as being like maps (Harvey, 1972) . (8) As geographers, we should all know how maps work: well, argues Harvey, theories are the same as maps because they also serve to help us find our way around without getting``lost in too much richness or complexity'' (page 32). Just as there are different types of mapöchoropleth, dot, isoplethöso there are different types of representational theory: scientific, normative, and probabilistic theory are those that Harvey likens to maps. Harvey (1972, page 32) argues that maps and theories both function in four important ways: first, as``efficient storage devices for information collected over many years by many different people''; second, as``general descriptions of what a certain area of reality' looks like''; third, both maps and theories form``a basis for generating expectations about what will happen if we go into a certain area ömore specifically we may use the map and the theory to deal with applied problems such as navigating (in the case of the map) or predicting (with the aid of a theory)''; fourth, Harvey views maps or theories as``a basis for thinking about more complicated relationships. These more complicated relationships may be`higher order' relationships such as some of the generalisations suggested by looking at map patterns, or they may simply be the sort in which we use the map or the theory as a base from which to explore a given territory for more intricate variation''. In short, it is plain`common sense' that, as part of our referential language, maps and theories embody the accumulated labour and thought of the past and serve as a reflection of a basic reality.
Interestingly, Harvey continues to draw analogies to maps and theories in his neoMarxist work. In The Urban Experience (1989b) Harvey likens theories no longer to conventional maps but to cognitive or mental maps:`T heories provide cognitive maps for finding our way in a complex and changeable environment ... . Purposeful theory construction, in much the same way, seeks an ordered and consistent though never entirely enclosed map, to improve our understanding and command of daily practices (social, political, economic or technological). Sophisticated or unsophisticated, the urge to construct and the need for some kind of cognitive map is a basic human attribute'' (page 2). Why does Harvey insist on cognitive maps? The answer is that for Harvey a cognitive map is vital for any kind of socialist strategy because it functions as a device that allows him to revert back to, that is to reinvent, a basic essentialism of both Marxist and neoMarxist theory. For Harvey,`cognitive map' is a code word for class consciousness. This is why he insists on it, just like Jameson [cognitive map equals class consciousness (see Jameson, 1991, page 418) ] and all the others, precisely because it leaves open the door to a fundamental, and certainly flawed, tenet of so many Marxisms (that you need the idea of class consciousness if you want to further class interests!) All the talk of a new spatiality implicit in the postmodern, typified by Soja and his remarkably unpostmodern Postmodern Geographies (1989), can be seen as a convenient argument for the production of new cognitive maps. Indeed, one can sense the political crisis and desperation of these authors as they struggle to hold on to`imaginary maps'. For example, Jameson (1991, page 416) writes that,``... the incapacity to map spatially is as crippling to political experience as the analogous incapacity to map spatially is for urban experience. It follows that an aesthetic of cognitive mapping in this sense is an integral part of any socialist strategy''. Is this their final throw of the dice, their final plea for us to turn a blind eye to essentialism and suspend our disbelief?
Despite this wordplay it is nevertheless easy to agree with Harvey when he writes of the need for a diversity of theoretical perspectives,``... there are as many different types of theory as there are types of map and each kind of theory has its own peculiar rules of construction. An early mistake of theoretical geographers was to think of theory building as a far more monolithic operation than it really is'' (1972, page 33). For Harvey, and those who follow a certain style of geographical thinking, theories are about building, and territories come before maps. Scientific theory, normative theory, probabilistic theory, Marxist and neo-Marxist theories all put the world to account; they all, to one extent or another,`measure-up' to the real world`out there' waiting to be accounted for. But, as Harvey advises, let us not be too monolithic in our thinking. How else might we think? What if maps come before territories or, in other words, what if theory comes before reality? What if theory or knowledge become true when they are applied to the`real world'? Let us pursue the map analogy in our discussion of the trip from representational theory (the space of signs) to Baudrillard's nonrepresentational theory.
Phase two: maps before territories`.
.. the imageöit masks and perverts a basic reality.' ' Baudrillard (1983, page 11) We will think about this phase by considering three tales which enable us to continue to think in terms of maps and territories and to see where`critical' theory öwith its surfaces and depthsötakes us. In the first story, which is by Keillor, there is a basic conflict between those who believe in the territory and those who believe in the map. In Garrison Keillor's comic novel Lake Wobegon Days (1993) there is a story in which, contrary to convention, the map comes before (Baudrillard would say precedes) the territory. It is a story where debate revolves around the map rather than around the territory, where the map is seen to mask and pervert the territory, and where we see quite clearly that representations can have material consequences. The crux of the novel, for our purposes, is that the Midwestern community of Lake Wobegon is not on the map because of the blunders of early cartographers. When the map did not quite fit the territory a section of Minnesota called Mist County had to be erased:``The legislature simply reproportioned the state by eliminating the overlap in the middle, the little quadrangle that is Mist County'' (Keillor, 1993, page 135) . Over time the mistake was not rectified and Lake Wobegon, and indeed all of Mist County, was in a sense lost, as it was off the map. Eventually, attempts were made to rectify the cartographic errors, with the consequence of producing all sorts of problems and conflicts that ultimately divide the Wobegon community. Keillor amusingly writes that,`P roponents of map change, or`accurates' as they were called, were chastised by their opponents, the so-called`moderates', who denied the existence of Mist County on the one hand ö`Where is it?' a moderate cried one day on the Senate floor in St. Paul.`Can you show me one scintilla of evidence that it exists?'öand, on the other hand, denounced the county as a threat to property owners everywhere. If this county is allowed to rear its head, then no boundary is sacred, no deed is certain', the moderates said.`We might as well reopen negotiations with the Indians' '' (page 135). A legislative commission proposed that by reducing the space occupied on the map by a number of lakes the missing land could be reinstated: if the lakes could be elongated then no valuable shoreline property would be lost. However, the proposal was lost because of opposition from the Bureau of Fisheries, who were concerned that the reduction in the size of the lakes would mean the loss of valuable walleye breeding grounds. Clearly changes to the map are very important matters even if the territory remains unchanged throughout. Here the map precedes the territory and masks and perverts the basic reality. The arguments over changes to the mapöthe very fact that debate was conducted in terms of the map rather than in terms of the territoryörecognise that reality is as much a social construct as an ontological given. Here we recognise that representations are always already caught up in political, social, cultural, economic, and other processes. In other words, in the novel the map (a particular and peculiar representation of a territory) becomes the important issue rather than the territory itself. We have begun to make an important journey from being obsessed with the territory (the real) to realising that in fact it is the map (the representation) where the locus for change lies. Here debate is about the map rather than about the territory because what is important is the issue of representation and how and for whom the real is constructed.
Consider another little fable. This time the story is from 1658, by Suarez Miranda, and is often, because of a mistake by Baudrillard which is repeated by others (for example, Crang, 1999, page 60; Jameson, 1991, page 430; G King, 1996 , page 4), attributed to Borges:`.
.. In that Empire, the Art of Cartography reached such Perfection that the map of one Province alone took up the whole of a City, and the map of the empire, the whole of a Province. Borges, 1991, page 90) ]. In contrast to Keillor's tale, here we have a story in which the map, rather than misrepresenting the territory, actually precedes the territory. Indeed, Miranda's story is rather like the story told by a character in Lewis Carroll's Sylvie and Bruno Concluded``T hat's another thing we've learned from your Nation', said Mein Herr,`mapmaking. But we've carried it much further than you. What do you consider the largest map that would be really useful?'.`About six inches to the mile'.`Only six inches!' exclaimed Mein Herr.`We very soon got to six yards to the mile. Then we tried a hundred yards to the mile. And then came the grandest idea of all! We actually made a map of the country, on the scale of a mile to the mile!'.`Have you used it much?' I enquired.`It has never been spread out, yet', said Meinn Herr: the farmers objected: they said it would cover the whole country, and shut out the sunlight! So we now use the country itself, as its own map, and I assure you it does nearly as well' '' (1894, found in 1982, page 524). Suarez Miranda's and Lewis Carroll's fables tell of fantastic, and rather mad, cartographic efforts where the map is coextensive with the territory. In Lewis Carroll's story the map is abandoned and in Miranda's fable we learn of the ruined abstraction of the map as it becomes frayed and finally lost,``rather as an aging double ends up being confused with the real thing'' (Baudrillard, 1983 , page 1). These stories are important as the map (or theory) has been abandoned because the closer it has come to the territory (or the real) the more useless it has becomeöin fact, when the map covers the whole of the territory something like reality disappears.`T his representational imaginary, which both culminates in and is engulfed by the cartographer's mad project of an ideal coextensivity between the map and the territory'' (Baudrillard, 1983 , page 3), belongs to the second stage of the precession of simulacra and disappears in the third and fourth stages (where we enter Baudrillard's account of simulation),``whose operation is nuclear and genetic, and no longer specular and discursive''. In the third and fourth stages we have passed Foucault's threshold of the real [in his pamphlet Forget Foucault (1987) Baudrillard critiqued Foucault for holding on to the reality principle in his discussion of power], and if we were to revive Miranda's fable the outcome would be reversed, it would be the territory whose shreds would be slowly rotting across the map, and therefore the real, not the image, whose vestiges would subsist here and there. Baudrillard (2000, page 63) explains how far we have come,``We live as if inside Borges' fable of the map and the territory; in this story nothing is left but pieces of the map scattered throughout the empty space of the territory. Except that we must turn the tale upside down: today there is nothing left but a map (the virtual abstraction of the territory), and on this map some fragments of the real are still floating and drifting. '' But what if it is not even a case of maps or theories preceding territories or the real? What then? We are used to the idea of believing in the real world (and as a consequence in both imagination and illusion), in the ideatum and in``...the hypothesis that ideas have referents and that there is a possible ideation of reality'' (Baudrillard, 1996a, page 96 Well what would be the role of theory then? Our means of abstraction would no longer be the map, the mirror, the double, or even the theatre and its games of mask and appearance, but rather it would be the model as it is this that produces our real, the`signifier of reference', which is without origin or reality: a hyperreality. As strange as it may sound we must journey without maps because in our sim-territory' (the hyperrealöwhere sign and reality share a single shroud), we have passed beyond McLuhan, who said that`the medium is the message' (that could be the slogan for the second phase), to a cellular space [to visualise the topology of this space imagine cancer: cells proliferating as they follow a logic of potentialisation (Steigerung), an elevation to the second power, to the nth power, which is the logic of the simulacrum and the rise and rise of the commodity^sign (see Baudrillard, 1990a) ], where we can no longer distinguish between message and messenger or between maps and territories. This is space that is impassable and unsurpassable, bounded, checkmated, immanent, with nothing beyond it, folded into an exterior (that is, not`outside'), that is closed and beyond the golden age of transcendence, the field of production, or dialectical negation; for Baudrillard, we can no longer move`through the mirror' to find the alter ego on the other side.
Phrase three: neither maps nor territories`.
.. the imageöit masks the absence of a basic reality.'' Baudrillard (1983, page 11)`.
.. the highest function of the sign is to make reality disappear and, at the same time, to mask that disappearance.'' Baudrillard (1996a, page 5) That a map (or theory) describes and summarises knowledge of a territory (the real) is the fundamental ontological assumption of geography and cartography. As Ullman (1953, page 57) reflects,``the map was a theory which geographers had accepted''. Baudrillard unravels this assumption, in the movement from the material (seen as separate from the immaterial) to the nonseparation of the material and the dematerial, and argues that with the model (and in simulation) it is no longer the case of having either maps or territories because the distinction between them has vanished. This takes us into the scenario of living in a world that cannot be represented, precisely because (like it, or not) we have been substituting signs of the real for the real itself. In the spaces of simulation the real has become confused with the model and thus has ended the theatre of representation;``So it is with simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation'' (Baudrillard, 1983 , page 11). Debord made room for critical consciousness and demystification, observing that,`t he spectacle is the map of this new world, a map which exactly covers its territory'' (1983, page 31). But Baudrillard goes significantly further than Debord to argue that,`w hen the map covers all the territory, something like the reality principle disappears'' (1991b, page 311). In other words, the map masks the absence of a basic reality. The movement from Debord to Baudrillard is that of the`precession of simulacra', where we move from the first and second stages, to the third and fourth stages, where signs of the real have replaced the real, and where actually it is no longer the case of there being either maps or territories. Thus, Baudrillard bypasses the work of writers such as Benjamin (1992) , Debord (1983) , and McLuhan (1962) to provide an extravagant and challenging theoretical description of how the current phase of capitalism is closed, beyond representation, and how in this phase the signified and use value are absent.
Let me explain what has happenedöhow we have lost our guarantees of realityöthrough a discussion of Saussure's account of the linguistic sign, Marx's account of the commodity^form, and Baudrillard's theorisation of the commodity^sign and of hyperreality (9) where we have the absence of a basic reality and so ultimately no reality whatsoever.
The Saussurian sign, the basis of both structuralism and poststructuralism, is an inseparable dyad with one side being the`signifier' (sound image, material aspect, or expression), which engenders in an arbitrary bond the other side called the`signified' (mental idea, concept, or content). The Saussurian sign signifies through this relation and its difference from other signs (langue), and can be expressed by diagrams or algorithms (see figure 1) . The arrows in figure 1 indicate the inseparability of the signifier and the signified. The signifier incites a signified, and the signified demands a signifier.
For Derrida, Saussure is guilty of logocentrism as he privileges speech over writing when he implies that the spoken signifier is closer to the signified. Thus, Saussure argues, according to Derrida, that writing is secondary and`outside' in that it functions to represent the spoken. Derrida's work seeks out the consequences of this insight and journeys from diffe¨rence and the transcendental signified to diffe¨rance and the endless flow of all those traces of traces. For Foucault, and post-Marxists like Laclau and Mouffe (1990) , the important thing is not language or linguistics as such, but`discourse'. In other words, Foucault was interested in the production of knowledge and meaning through discourse, rather than through language as with Saussure. However, unlike either Derrida or Foucault, to understand Baudrillard we need to begin with an understanding of both Saussure's sign and Marx's account of the commodity^form.
Marx began Capital (1990) with a dissection of the commodity, adding exchange value to use value (a realm which was seen as in and beyond political economy) in order to explain it. Harvey's (1982) work spelled out Marx's description of the commodity, and it was his opening of Marx's work in particular that provided a lifeline to many from a generation of geographers who were dissatisfied and looking for a way out of a conservative positivism and a nascent (though, even then, seemingly unpromising) behaviouralism. However, unknown to Anglo-American geographers, Baudrillard (in the late 1960s) was already moving on from Marx's analysis of the commodity. Baudrillard was combining the insights of Saussure and Marx to produce a series of post-Marxist works (1975; 1981; 1996b; that explain how the commodity has not just use value (as Smith said) and exchange value (as Marx said), but also sign value. The definitive correlation between sign^form and commodity^form is: This description of the commodity^sign form combines the structural linguistic sign of Saussure and the commodity^form of Marx. Baudrillard radicalises structuralism and Marxism (10) to describe the`code' (aka hyperreality), where exchange value is to signifier as use value is to signified; this homologous relation provides a description of the general political economy of the sign (Baudrillard, 1981) . However, the point is that Baudrillard goes further than this to reveal that both signified and use value are no more than just illusory effects, merely the horizons of the signifier and exchange value (that is, there is no concrete value beyond the abstraction of exchange value).
For the purposes of our journey from representational theory to Baudrillard's nonrepresentational theory all we need to understand here is that Baudrillard's post-Marxism exposes the absence of the signified and use value, which are the guarantees of reality of structuralism and Marxism, respectively. In The Mirror of Production (1975) Baudrillard provides an analysis of``the third phase of political economy'', in which a shift has occurred from the law of general equivalence to the law of the`code'. Here we no longer talk about the use value of the signöthat is, a signified valueöbecause:`.
.. the signified and the referent are now abolished to the sole profit of the play of signifiers, of a generalized formalization in which the code no longer refers back to any subjective or objective`reality', but to its own logic. The signifier becomes its own referent and the use value of the sign disappears to the benefit of its commutation and exchange value alone. The sign no longer designates anything at all. It approaches its true structural limit which is to refer back only to other signs. All reality then becomes the place of a semiurgical manipulation, of a structural simulation'' (pages 127^128). In other words, exchange value becomes fused with use value and signifiers become fused with signifieds and referents to such an extent that there is no`outside' or beyond to the`code' or simulacrum. In the third phase of the hyperreal,``The very definition of the real becomes: that of which it is possible to give an equivalent reproduction'' (1983, page 146). Now, despite Baudrillard's efforts to describe and critique the (extreme) modern conditionö[what he, like the semiotician Eco (1987) , calls the`hyperreal', which``... transcends representation only because it is entirely in simulation'' (Baudrillard, 1983, page 147) ]ömany writers (including many of those so-called`new' cultural geographers) continue to produce representational theories of the nonrepresentational, modernist theories of the postmodern, or, as Baudrillard would say, first-order and second-order accounts of the third and fourth stages. Baudrillard's example is that of Jacques Monod, the Nobel prize winning molecular biologist, who wrote the famous book Chance and Necessity (1974) in which he argues that the origins of life and evolution are the product of chance while being perpetuated by the necessity of chemical reactions. Baudrillard considers this book to be contradictory because although it considers the indeterminable models of the third order it does so, Baudrillard contends, according to```scientific' schemes of the second-orderöobjectiveness,`scientific' ethic of knowledge, science's principle of truth and transcendence '' (1983, page 154) . However, we do not need to (10) It is puzzling as to why so many people refer to Marxism as structuralism, or as a form of structuralism (for example, see . The confusion may be a product of Althusser's structural-Marxism, which is often said to be`influenced' by, or drawn up in the climate of, structuralism. Alternatively, it may be down to humanists (or Giddens, or even those realists), who often, and incorrectly, portrayed and portray Marxism as a form of structuralism. Let me clear things up. Both structuralism and Marxism are concerned with structures; however, the key point seems to me to be that all of structuralism (from Saussure to Barthes to Le¨vi-Strauss to Piaget, etc) is synchronic (to one degree or another ahistorical), whereas Marxisms are fundamentally diachronic (for example, modes of production, which, it is argued and hoped, change over time). The distinction between structuralism and Marxism fundamentally depends on one's take on time (see Sturrock, 1979) . feed the mania of Sokal and Bricmont (1998) by going into the natural sciences to find examples. In human geography and the social sciences there are many examples. Harvey provides a remarkably modernist account of postmodernity in his book The Condition of Postmodernity (1989a) precisely because he takes neo-Marxism, which is a second-order theory, to explain a third-order and fourth-order condition of simulacra and simulations. When Harvey argues that,``... it is now possible to experience the world's geography vicariously, as a simulacrum'' (page 300), what he means is that it is possible to experience it`as an image'. Indeed, Harvey (page 87) views images and reconstructions, even nondiscursive practices such as costume dramas and staged ethnic festivals (and presumably other practices such as theatrical and musical performances, performance art, and dance), as little more than masks that pervert and denature as they``... draw a veil over real geography''. For Harvey (see page 303), as for any dictionary,`simulacrum' is just another word for image (which is totally different to Baudrillard's usage) and so thè simulacrum' hides, conceals, and masks``almost perfectly any trace of origin ...'' (page 300). However, Baudrillard's argument is that`critical theory' is now an impotent tool incapable of exposing the invisible hand(s) which work to transform our world into a place of (empty) transparency and visibility: the murder of reality is a crime that alas cannot be solved (see 1996a) precisely because all`critical distance' (the meta of metatheory) has vanished into the play of signs.
In the third phase it is no longer tenable to have critical pretensions, dialectical illusions, or to live off the gap, to seek to find the essence behind appearance, the latent (unconscious desire) behind the manifest (symptom), the authentic behind the inauthentic, the signified behind the signifier, or even production beneath the superstructure, or perhaps the relations of force or power beneath the ideological or normative shell. This is not the place for metanarratives, metadiscourses, metalanguages, metatheories, grand narratives, high theories, erect theories, grand theories, unified theories,`depth models', hermeneutics of suspicion', specular watchtowers, dialectics, monochromatic theories, reflective theories, or whatever term you want to invent that legitimates the act of drawing a line, fixing a boundary, marking a depth, or erecting a binary between such ideas as true ' and`false' or`real' and`imaginary'. Harvey's simulacrum (that is, image) belongs to the second phase of ideology, but in the third stage of the precession``Ideology only corresponds to a betrayal of reality by signs; simulation corresponds to a short-circuit of reality and its reduplication by signs. It is always the aim of ideological analysis to restore the objective process; it is always a false problem to want to restore the truth beneath the simulacrum'' (Baudrillard, 1983, page 48) . We have learnt that there is no separation of economy and culture in the political economy of the sign (Saussure and Marx come together in Baudrillard's theory of cultural economy) and therefore it should be clear to you why Baudrillard argues that with the simulacrum there is no real that is`outside' and available for betrayal by signs.
Theories of the first and second phases (where thought is bound to the real), with which so-called`critical theorists' or`propagandists of reality' (Baudrillard, 1996a) are so familiar and comfortable, have no function in the third phase of the simulacrum (the realm of signifiers). As we have seen, representational theories cannot help themselves for they are always trying to deny the murderous capacity of images, trying to absorb simulation by interpreting it as false representation, whereas``simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum' ' (1983, page 11) . Where Baudrillard takes us is to the point of needing a form of theory or way of going on that is somehow nonrepresentational: a stranger to dialectics and critical thought. This is, in other words, a theory that is not a first-order or second-order theory pretending to stand outside and explain a third-order and fourth-order condition. Now what becomes interesting are those theories that are a radical challenge to the final stages of the precession (where we have the disappearance of the real) and which seek to contribute to undoing those repressive regimes, orders, significations, or constructions of meaning and reality revealed by structuralists and their like as they worked out the harnessing of signifiers to signifieds. Rivkin and Ryan (1998, page 334) put it well when they write that:`S tructuralists saw signs as windows to a trans-empirical world of crystalline order, of identities of form that maintained themselves over time and outside history, of codes of meaning that seemed exempt from the differences entailed by the contingencies of living examples. Post-structuralism claims all such orders are strategies of power and social control, ways of ignoring reality rather than understanding it. It was time, they argued, to burn down the signs and with the signs, all the orders of meaning and or reality that signs help maintain'' (my emphasis). (11) Phase four: Baudrillard's nonrepresentational theories`.
.. the imageöit bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum.' ' Baudrillard (1983, page 11 )`F or after the natural, commodity, and structural stages of value comes the fractal stage ... . At the fourth [stage], the fractal (or viral, or radiant) stage of value, there is no point of reference at all, and value radiates in all directions, occupying all interstices, without reference to anything whatsoever, by virtue of pure contiguity.' ' Baudrillard (1993a, page 5) In this paper we have been thinking about the changing relationship between thought and reality (between maps, other theories, and the`real'). And with Baudrillard's precession and orders of simulacra we have seen how representational theories of the first and second order (the work of Harvey was used because many of you will be familiar with it) (12) can no longer challenge the nonrepresentation of Baudrillard's third-order simulacrum (and, in fact, of his fourth-order simulacrum, as these last two phases should very much be seen as entwined). We have now reached a stage where thought is no longer bound to the real, where ideas no longer have referents, and so where any theory has to be nonrepresentational if it is to critique the simulacrum (also known in Baudrillard's oeuvre as`the code of social standing ' in 1968, as the`code' in 1970, as the`political (11) A well-known poststructuralist example which you might think of here is Foucault's fantastic studies of repressive discourses. (1975) and Herculine Barbin (1980). Foucault's work contributes to the liberation or release of those imprisoned energies, potentials, and drives that disturb existing systematic orders and produce different kinds of societies in thought and being. Kerouac (1976, page 256) put it perfectly in On the Road when he wrote:``He told me what it was to`signify'.`Anybody that's leaving jail soon and starts talking about his release date is``signifying'' to the other fellas that [they] have to stay. We take him by the neck and say,``Don't signify with me!'' Bad thing, to signifyöy'hear me? ' ''. (12) What is more, Baudrillard's nonrepresentational theory cannot be utopian like Harvey's current theoretical efforts (Harvey, 2000) . Utopia as transcendence (counterpoised as an ideal alternative world) reminds us of those`socialists' such as Owen, Fourier, Rouvroy, and Saint-Simon in that it belongs to the first order of simulacra where there is a significant distance between real and imaginary (the zero degree of dialectical synthesis)ö``it is the utopian island in contrast to the continent of the real'' (Baudrillard, 1991b, page 309) . In the second order of simulacra, utopia simply``multiplies the world's own possibilities'' in the potentially limitless universe of the productive era. In the third and fourth order of simulacra the critical distance upon which utopia relies has vanished or imploded into models which``no longer constitute an imaginary domain with reference to the real; they are, themselves, an apprehension of the real, and thus leave no room economy of the sign' in 1972, as the`structural law of value' in 1976, and as`hyperreality', simulation', and`simulacra' from around 1981). Yes, let me be crystal clear dear readers of Society and Space, Baudrillard's entire oeuvre is doubly nonrepresentational. In other words, Baudrillard has developed both a theory of the nonrepresentational simulacrum and a nonrepresentational challenge to the simulacrum; Baudrillard is against Baudrillard.
In a previous paper (Smith with Doel, 2001 ) it was shown, amongst other things, how Baudrillard's oeuvre is structured by a`double spiral' (the semiotic being challenged by the symbolic) that cannot be disentangled because Baudrillard's theory is both simulation and challenge (also see Merrin, 2001) . Thus, what also constitutes Baudrillard's nonrepresentational theory are ideas that`burn signs', ideas that are nonrepresentational challenges to the nonrepresentational simulacrum. What are these ideas?
In``Why theory?'' (Baudrillard, 2001c ) the nonrepresentational nature of Baudrillard's theoretical challenge is clearly stated. Contrary to Harvey's view, Baudrillard insists that the role of theory is not``to be the reflection of the real, or to enter into a relation of critical negativity with the real'' (page 129). Rather, the role of theory is``... to seduce, to wrest things from their condition, to force them into an over-existence which is incompatible with the real'' (page 129). In other words, theory must be an event. For Baudrillard, theory no longer aspires to the discourse of truth and must therefore deploy the same strategy as its object: it must become simulation if it speaks about simulation, it must become seduction if it speaks about seduction, etc. More than this though, because for Baudrillard theory must defy the world to be more than it is: if the world is real then theory must be more real; if the world is ironic then theory must be more ironic; if the world is fatal then theory must be more fatal, etc. Baudrillard's challenge to the nonrepresentation of the simulacrum has been a range of ideas (but not concepts). Baudrillard explains that:``The fatal, the obscene, the reversible, the symbolic, are not concepts, since nothing distinguishes the hypothesis from the assertion. The enunciation of the fatal is also fatal, or it is nothing at all. In this sense it is a discourse where truth is withdrawn (just as one pulls a chair out from under a person about to sit down)'' (pages 130^131). Indeed, there is a whole range of nonrepresentational ideas that make up the`spiral of the symbolic' and which over Baudrillard's oeuvre have functioned as his challenge to the simulacrum: the main challenges have been`symbolic exchange ' (1993b),`seduction' (1990b) ,`fatal strategies' (1990a), and in recent years`radical illusion ' (1996a; 2001a) . How are these ideas nonrepresentational? Let me take seduction as an example.
Seduction for Baudrillard is a symbolic act in which there is no representation:`S eduction cannot possibly be represented, because in seduction the distance between the real and its double, and the distortion between the Same and the Other, is abolished'' (1990b, page 67). Thus, seduction for Baudrillard is an appealing principle for the development of a nonrepresentational theory that burns signs because it allows one to imagine a theory that treats signs in terms of their seductive attraction, rather than in terms of their contrasts and oppositions. In Baudrillard's words,`S uppose that all the major, diacritical oppositions with which we order our world were traversed by seduction, instead of being based on contrasts and oppositions.
(12) continued for any fictional extrapolation öthey are immanent, and therefore leave no room for any kind of transcendentalism'' (page 310). In short,``from one order of simulacra to the next, we are witnessing the reduction and absorption of this distance, of this separation which permits a space for ideal and critical projection'' (page 309). Nonrepresentational theory has to cope with the paradox that utopia has been realised (see Baudrillard, 1988) . In a world of simulacra and simulations we can no longer pretend to find the critical distance of even, say, Debord's spectacle. For more on the antiutopian thought of Baudrillard, see Smith (1997) .
Suppose not just that the feminine seduces the masculine, but that absence seduces presence, cold seduces hot, the subject seduces the object, and to be sure, the reverse. For seduction supposes that minimum reversibility which puts an end to every fixed opposition and, therefore, every conventional semiology' ' (1990b, pages 103^104) . In other words, seduction appeals to Baudrillard because for him it suggests an idea for a theory that undoes structures by burningöplaying withösigns. It is a matter of playing`bar games' (Genosko, 1990) , of putting the Saussurean bar into play in order to be anti-Saussure (or now antihyperreality öformerly you would be anti the political economy of the sign), to set`signification ablaze' (Genosko, 1994) , and therefore to develop nonrepresentational challenges to the simulacrum.
In short, Baudrillard has been doing nonrepresentational theory for a long time and in fact the essence of his thought is that it is doubly nonrepresentational. Both sides of the`double spiral' involve the production of a nonrepresentational theory. In this paper we have followed the spiral of the semiotic (journeyed without maps) to both understand the nonrepresentational simulacrum and to reject representational theories as a viable challenge to the simulacrum that Baudrillard has invented and described [for example, the horror of the achieved utopia that is America (1988)]. As a conclusion, I have just pointed to the other spiral in Baudrillard's oeuvre, the spiral of the symbolic that charts Baudrillard's attemptsöover the yearsöto develop nonrepresentational theories that can he hopes challenge the nonrepresentation of the simulacrum.
Final thought: journey without maps`W e are no longer spectators, but actors in the performance, and actors increasingly integrated into the course of that performance.' ' Baudrillard (1996a, page 27) As a final thought consider Graham Greene's choice of quote to serve as the epigraph to his novel entitled Journey Without Maps (1971) . This is how to go about things, because in the world of models and simulations (`inside', for want of a better word, Baudrillard's simulacrum) there is no`view of the world' or`approach', just image for image, a freefloating chain of signs where nothing signifies, an endless continguity of fragments where distinctionsösuch as those between fiction and truthöare meaningless:`T he life of an individual is in many respects like a child's dissected map. If I could live a hundred years, keeping my intelligence to the last, I feel as if I could put the pieces together until they made a properly connected whole. As it is, I, like all others, find a certain number of connected fragments, and a larger number of disjointed pieces, which I might in time place in their natural connection. Many of these pieces seem fragmentary, but would in time show themselves as essential parts of the whole. What strikes me very forcibly is the arbitrary and as it were accidental way in which the lines of junction appear to run irregularly among the fragments. With every decade I find some new pieces coming into place. Blanks which have been left in former years find their complement among the undisturbed fragments. If I could look back on the whole, as we look at the child's map when it is put together, I feel that I should have my whole life intelligently laid out before me ...'' (Oliver Wendell Holmes, cited in Greene, 1971, unpaginated) In journeying nothing adds up, there are no equations, and no summation. Hindsight, pretending to step outside of language and the simulacrum, creates the retrospective illusion of things coming together into ordered systems, but there are no unities or stable identities. Knowable structures do not underlie empirical events; reality is a play of forces in differential flux with no order, logic, or meaning. All is contingent, nothing has any meaning, all thinking is groundless, all we can do is throw ourselves into the play of the world and dance with it.
